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Executive Summary 
 
The EU Commission – in line with its mandate given by the member states – places an emphasis on the 
enhancement of the internal market for services. Through further harmonization of the so-called 
regulated professions, the EU Commission intends to intensify the competition and simplify and 
strengthen the cross-border provision of services. 
The architectural profession belongs to this group of regulated professions. All Member States want 
to ensure a certain minimum quality in the field of architectural services via regulative market 
interventions. The reason for these market interventions is to ensure the protection of public interests 
– such as construction safety, consumer and environmental protection as well as cultural, historical, 
and artistic concerns. For this purpose, the Member States have chosen different approaches. 
In continental Europe in particular, the Member States pursue an ex-ante approach. This approach is 
intended to ensure the desired minimum quality level through education requirements and further 
training. Exclusive professional rights are to guarantee that safety-relevant activities are only carried 
out by appropriately qualified persons. Monitoring is often organized within a framework of a 
professional self-administration in a chamber system. 
Mainly in Northern Europe, the Member States follow an ex-post approach. This approach should 
ensure the desired minimum mainly quality through a more stringent liability right. High potential 
claims for compensation or corresponding premium adjustments in compulsory occupational liability 
insurance should prevent suppliers from offering poor quality. 
In principle, the Member States are free to choose one of these historically developed approaches 
European jurisprudence assesses both approaches as equal. However, the EU Commission assumes 
that a certain form of regulation could yield to better outcomes regarding the competitiveness of the 
architectural markets in the Member States. A more competition-friendly regulation should be 
beneficial for the consumers and other companies that purchase architectural services – at least as 
long as a more competition-friendly regulation leads to lower prices without threatening the required 
quality and safety standards. A further benefit of a more competition-friendly regulation could be 
better job opportunities for young professionals that want to enter a market. The EU Commission 
mainly relies on differences in aggregated statistical data and regulation indicators to demonstrate the 
thesis of different levels of competition across the architectural markets in the Member States. 
But do the different regulatory approaches of the Member States indeed differ in terms of a different 
level of competition? This paper questions if these indicators are in fact evidence of a different level 
of competition on the architectural markets of the Member States. This question is relevant since a 
potential further harmonization of rules would needs a target. If no regulatory approach can be 
identified as clearly superior, at last no economic justification could be given for a further 
harmonization of the regulatory environment. In this case it seems somehow hasty to abolish existing 
systems that are functional in the respective national context.1  
A summary of the indicators used by the EU Commission can be found in the first part of the interim 
report "mutual evaluation of regulated professions" for the profession of architects.2 We have 
                                                          
1 This research was supported in part by a research grant provided by the Architects Council of Europe (ACE) 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/13382/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native  
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analysed four theses, which are implicitly based on these indicators. We have come to the following 
conclusions: 
 Thesis number one: Enterprises in the architectural sector are too small due to 
insufficient competition 
 
This thesis is based on the observation of different average firm-size across the Member 
States. However, the simple observation of small enterprises in the European architectural 
sector is no reliable indicator for an improper regulation hampering potential adaptation 
processes and cost-savings. A smaller firm size could also be an adaption to consumer 
preferences for local offices and/or a decision for outsourcing of some production stages. 
 Thesis number two: Too high profit margins in parts of the European architectural 
sector 
 
This thesis is based on the observation of an above-average gross operating rate in the 
architectural sector in most Member States in comparison to the total business economy and 
a great variation of the gross operating rate between the architectural sectors of the Member 
States. However, the gross operating rate is no reliable indicator for the level of competition. 
In the case of a high share of self-employed owners, this indicator is systematically biased. The 
proportion of self-employment is higher in the architectural sector than in the total business 
economy and varies to a very high extend across the Member States. Therefore, the gross 
operating rate cannot necessarily provide a reliable indication for potential reforms in the 
architectural sector. The interpretation of the gross-operating rate is even more difficult due 
to the varying share of intermediate inputs across the architectural sectors in the Member 
States.  
 Thesis number three: Too low productivity in the European architectural sector 
 
This thesis is based on the observation of a lower value-added per person employed in the 
architectural sector when compared to other sectors. However, a comparison of the value-
added per person employed between more and less capital-intensive sectors is biased. Since 
the input of machineries in the labour-intensive architectural sector is below the economy-
wide average, a lower value added per person employed is not uncommon. The observation 
of a different value-added per persons employed across sectors with different production 
structures is no reliable indicator for insufficient competition in the architectural sector.  
 Thesis number four: Anticompetitive regulation in some Member States compared to 
others based on the OECD-indicator 
 
This thesis is based on the observation on different values in the OCED-regulation indicator for 
architectural services across the Member States. However, the OECD regulation indicator does 
not sufficiently reflect the actual level of regulation in the Member States and favours the 
regulatory system of subsequent control (ex-post regulation). 
 
Nevertheless, we see a certain need for further reforms in some Member States. These reforms could 
address restrictions of interprofessional cooperation and advertising restrictions. Regarding fixed fees, 
we see a need for further research. 
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Background of the ongoing debate on reforming the regulatory framework for 
regulated professions 
The EU Commission is assigned various tasks by virtue of the EU treaties. Being the ‘engine of the 
European agreement’, it is its duty to, amongst other things, take political initiatives in the Union’s 
interest. The EU Commission – in line with its mandate given by the member states – places one 
emphasis on the enhancement of the internal market for goods and services.  
The European Union features a variety of so-called regulated professions. This term stems from the 
Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications where ‘regulated profession’ is defined as 
‘a professional activity […], access to which, the pursuit of which, or one of the modes of pursuit of 
which is subject, directly or indirectly, by virtue of legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions to 
the possession of specific professional qualifications’ (Article 3.1a of the Directive). The architectural 
profession also belongs to this group. 
According to the EU Commission, such regulation hinders the internal market for services. Whilst the 
Commission does not urge the abolition of all regulation concerning the area of profession, it does call 
for a stronger harmonisation of the member states’ own relevant provisions. In order to pursue this 
aim, the EU Commission has recently recommended an array of measures. As of recently, the EU-
Commission undertook a procedure of mutual evaluation of regulated professions on the basis of 
Article 59 of the revised Directive on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications.3 The aim of this 
procedure is the evaluation of national provisions on admission to regulated professions. It is being 
examined whether these provisions are non-discriminatory4, whether the regulations on admission to 
the profession are ‘justified by an overriding reason of general interest’5 and whether they are 
proportionate6. 
The evaluation was not performed by the EU-Commission itself, but was instead made the 
responsibility of the member states. Member states which did not regulate a profession are meant to 
‘provide information on any alternative mechanisms guaranteeing the respect of an overriding reason 
of general interest. This should allow a dialogue between Member States using different approaches, 
where the impact of all types of formal and informal restrictions on the access to professional activities 
should be examined.’7 
After the mutual evaluation’s completion, the EU-Commission published various professional reports8, 
including one on the architecture profession. In this report the Commission firstly presents its 
economic assumptions which they base their actions upon. Subsequently, the conclusions of the 
reports stemming from the member states are summarised. The publication of the evaluation’s results 
                                                          
3Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of 
professional qualifications; Directive 2013/55/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
2013 amending Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications and Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘IMI Regulation’). 
4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and The European Economic and 
Social Committee on Evaluating national regulations on access to professions, COM(2013) 676 final, p. 8. 
5Communication ‘Evaluating national regulations on access to profession’, (Fn. 4), p. 8. 
6Communication ‘Evaluating national regulations on access to profession’, (Fn. 4), p. 8. 
7 Communication ‘Evaluating national regulations on access to profession’, (Fn. 4), p. 8. 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/free-movement-professionals/transparency-mutual-
recognition/index_en.htm.  
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is planned for the end of 2016 / beginning of 2017.9 In addition, the EU-Commission put forward the 
idea of producing periodic reports on the progress of reforming regulated professions in the member 
states.10 By doing this, the EU-Commission does not only want to issue reports on the basis of 
qualitative and quantitative surveys and comparative investigations, but also looks at recommending 
possible reforms in the member states. The Commission wants to limit its actions on the professions 
of the ‘priority sector’, especially civil engineers and architects.11 
This research report analyses the economic observations and theses of the European Commission 
which state a further need for reforms in the European architectural sector.  
  
                                                          
9  Roadmap ‘Guidance on reforms needs for Member States in regulation of professions‘, p. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_grow_059_guidance_reform_needs_en.pdf . 
10 Roadmap ‘Guidance on reforms needs for Member States in regulation of professions‘, p. 4, link see above 
11 Roadmap ‘Guidance on reforms needs for Member States in regulation of professions‘, p. 4, link see above 
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On thesis number one: Enterprises in the architectural sector are too small due 
to insufficient competition 
 
The European Commission states that the average enterprise in the European architectural sector has 
less employees than the average enterprise across all economic sectors. In almost all Member States12, 
the average enterprise would have two or three times more employees than the average architectural 
office (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Thesis number one of the European Commission: Too small enterprises in the 
European architectural sector 
 
Source: European Commission, Mutual evaluation of regulated professions, Overview of the regulatory framework in the 
business services sector by using the example of architects (GROW/E-5), p. 3 (2015)   
 
Why should the average size of the enterprises constitute an indicator for potential reforms of the 
architects’ regulatory framework? The assumption is that a below-average company arises from an 
insufficient adaptation process due to inadequate regulation, which protects the enterprises from 
competition. One consequence of the insufficient competition may be that the enterprises do not 
make full use of resource-saving economies of scale, because there are few incentives for the 
                                                          
12 For ease of reading, the EU Member States and Norway are referred to collectively as “Member States” in this 
document. Most statistical data in this report on the architectural sector is based on the annual detailed enterprise 
statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95) for the year 2014. Czech Republic, Estonia, Malta reported no 
date to the annual detailed enterprise statistics for the architectural sector. For this reason, these Member States 
cannot be included in most statistical analysis. Link to the annual detailed enterprise statistics for the architectural 
sector: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=sbs_na_1a_se_r2&lang=en  
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enterprises to grow or to merge. Potential cost savings in favour of the consumer would remain 
unrealised.  
However, the average number of persons employed per enterprise cannot be interpreted as a proof 
or indicator for missing adaptation processes and inefficiencies in a specific sector. In economic theory, 
there is no external criterion to identify the optimal size of an enterprise. The appropriate company 
size depends on specific circumstances such as requirements and preferences of the customers 
regarding the product or the possibility to outsource parts of the production by buying suitable 
intermediate goods.  
The share of intermediate inputs varies considerably across the architectural sectors of the Member 
States (see figure 2). In some Member States, the average architectural office purchases intermediate 
services and goods from other enterprises that count for about 60 percent of the total turnover. In 
many cases, there is an above-average amount of intermediate consumption in countries with smaller 
companies (see e.g. Belgium, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria). In these Member States 
the companies seem to purchase intermediate inputs instead of producing them in-house with own 
employees. On the other side, in most countries with an above-average enterprise size the input-share 
is clearly below 50 percent. Apparently, the larger workforce seems (in part) to be used to keep more 
production steps in-house.   
 
Figure 2: Purchased intermediate goods as a percentage of the turnover in the architectural 
sectors in the Member States of the EU (year 2014) 
 
Source: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95), own calculation and presentation 
 
However, the difference in purchased intermediate goods cannot explain the varying company sizes in 
total (see Italy for example). Therefore, it is important to understand that the firm’s decision of the 
optimal size is also affected by the requirements and preferences of the customers. Looking at 
architectural services, the majority of consumers (and corporate clients) in some Member States could 
0%
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prefer individual solutions and local consulting. Such consumer demands may be best served by small, 
local architectural offices. In the case of individual, local solutions, the size advantages of a large 
company with more employees would be rather small.  
Because there is no right or wrong on the specific consumer demands, no judgement can be made 
about the size of the enterprises that stems from the adaptation to the given demand. Since the 
observed firm sizes do not allow to draw any conclusions, it is important to look at the market 
processes that lead to the market outcome. As long as there is no specific regulation that prefers one 
company size to another, there is no plausible argument why the specific firm size in each Member 
State should not reflect the given preferences of the consumers (and cooperate clients) as well as the 
company’s internal decision process about the risks and benefits of outsourcing parts of their 
production.  
In the given context it is necessary to prove that there are no specific regulations that might put bigger 
companies at a systematic disadvantage. In the area of regulated professions, this could be non-
necessary restrictions on inter-professional cooperation with other professions within one company 
as well as binding fixed fees. Restrictions on inter-professional cooperation could prevent potential 
benefits form economies of scope (synergies), e.g. the joint supply of services from architects and 
lawyers. Binding fixed fees could put bigger companies at a disadvantage since there is no possibility 
to share potential cost savings with potential customers in order to achieve a higher market share. 
However, when looking at the country-specific regulations in the area of inter-professional 
cooperation or binding fixed fees, most Member States have no relevant restrictions here (see also 
OECD Product Market Regulation Database). Therefore, it is not to be expected that the varying 
observable size of architectural offices in Europe is systematically distorted in favour of smaller 
companies. To clarify this point, it is worth to have a look at Italy. In Italy, there are neither binding 
fees nor restrictions on inter-professional cooperation that would favour small companies. 
Nevertheless, there is a high number of small, local architectural offices that produce most of their 
services in-house. This specific production structure seems to meet the specific demand in this country. 
As long as there are no systematic restrictions for other firm sizes to enter the market, there is no 
stringent argument against such a firm structure, even if this means that the consumers would pay 
higher prices for their demanded more individualized solutions.  
 
To sum up, the simple observation of small enterprises in the European architectural sector is no 
reliable indicator for an improper regulation hampering potential adaptation processes and cost-
savings. A smaller firm size could also be an adaption to consumer preferences for smaller and local 
architect's offices and/or a decision for outsourcing of some production stages. 
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On thesis number two: Too high profit margins in parts of the European 
architectural sector 
The European Commission states that the profitability of the architectural sector was higher than in 
the rest of the economy for the large majority of Member States. To support this thesis, the European 
Commission refers to the gross operating rates in the member states’ architectural sectors in their 
report on the mutual evaluation of the regulatory framework for architects (see figure 3). The gross 
operating rate is the ratio of the gross operating surplus and the turnover of a running enterprise.  
 
Figure 3: Thesis number two of the European Commission: Too high profit margins in parts of 
the European architectural sector 
 
Source: European Commission, Mutual evaluation of regulated professions, Overview of the regulatory framework in the 
business services sector by using the example of architects (GROW/E-5), p. 4 (2015) 
 
The European Commission interprets an above average gross operating rate as high company profits. 
The alleged high profit margins are used as an indicator for an anti-competitive regulation in the 
Member States concerned. The intuition behind this is that under perfect competitive conditions no 
company could make significant above average profits. High profit margins in a sector therefore serve 
as an indicator for a temporally shortage of a specific good or service. Under a competitive framework, 
other companies would enter the market for this specific good or service with lower prices to gain 
market shares. In the long-run, the surplus is supposed to settle on an average level.  
It is questionable whether there actually is a relation between the gross operating rate and insufficient 
competition. There are some considerations with regard to small enterprises that have to be taken 
into account: 
The gross operating surplus represents the excess amount of money generated by an enterprises' 
operating activities after paying for labour input costs and intermediate inputs that are purchased from 
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other firms. It is important to understand that labour input costs include only the wages for employees 
and not any salaries or hypothetical salaries for the working owner of the firm. In case of an owner-
managed enterprise, the operating surplus is the capital available that provides the subsistence for the 
self-employed owner. Furthermore, the operating surplus of an enterprise can be used to repay 
creditors, to finance all or part of potential investment and to pay taxes (after the deduction of a 
hypothetical salary for the self-employed owner according to the country specific tax law)13.  
In the hypothetical case of a small enterprise with a self-employed owner without employees and 
purchases of intermediate inputs from other firms, the gross operating rate would be per definition 
100 percent of the firm’s total turnover. In addition, this high gross operating rate is completely 
independent of how much the working owner earns by selling the produced goods or services. In this 
constructed example, the gross operating rate will remain at 100 percent, even if the profit margin can 
barely secure the subsistence of the self-employed owner.  
This may be an extreme example, but it provides a possible explanation for the high variation of the 
operating rates in the architectural sectors of the Member States. The share of self-employed owners 
in the Member States varies extremely (see figure 4). On the one hand, less than 10 percent of the 
total employment in the architectural offices in some Member States such as Latvia, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Romania or Norway (as an associated country) are self-employed owners. On the 
other hand, 85 percent of the total employment in Belgium and 96 percent in Italy are self-employed 
owners. 
                                                          
13 For this reason, the use of the ‘gross mixed income’ from the national accounts may be a more appropriate 
indicator. While the gross operation surplus roughly describes the return on the owners’ equity, the mixed income 
roughly represents the owners’ combined income out of labour and equity invested. However, Eurostat does not 
provide data on the gross mixed income in the architectural sector. Furthermore, the comparison of the ‘gross 
mixed income’ as a percentage of the turnover (following the idea of the gross operating rate) across different 
countries is hardly feasible. Such an indicator would be systematically distorted by a varying turnover due to 
different firm size across the Member States. 
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Figure 4: Share of (unpaid) self-employed owners on total employment who earn their living 
on the operating surplus (year 2014) 
 
Source: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95), own calculation and presentation 
 
As is to be expected, the share of self-employed owners is particularly high in those Member States 
that report an above average gross operating rate in their architectural sector. To make the connection 
between the share of self-employment and the resulting operating surplus even more clear, it is 
worthy to look at the correlation between these two statistical values across all Member States. 
Assuming that there is a simple linear relationship between declining surplus and increasing labour 
costs (due to a higher share of employees), a considerable part of the variation of the operating rates 
across the Member States can be explained (see figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Correlation between the gross operating rate and the personnel costs as a 
percentage of the turnover in the architectural sectors of the Member States (year 2014) 
 
 
Source: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95), own calculation and presentation 
 
The scatter plot shows that in most cases the gross operating surplus is relatively low when the share 
of self-employed owners who make their living on the gross operating surplus is relatively low, too. 
However, some results seem contradictory at first sight. For example, the average architectural 
enterprises in Italy and Belgium have roughly the same share of self-employed owners and thereof 
resulting low expenses for wage payments. Nevertheless, the gross operating surplus between both 
states varies to a high extend. To understand the main reason for this unexplained difference, a look 
at the different shares of purchased intermediate inputs between the sectors in the two countries is 
helpful (see figure 2).  
The average architectural office in Belgium purchases intermediate inputs that account for almost 70 
percent of the total turnover. This is the highest share of purchased intermediate inputs among all 
member states. For the statistical value of the gross operating rate, however, it makes no difference 
whether a large part of the turnover is generated by the work of paid employees or by acquisitions of 
intermediate inputs from other firms. In both cases, the share of the input of a self-employed owner 
in relation to the total turnover decreases. As a result, the observed operating surplus that 
remunerated the working owner decreases as well. Against this background it is not surprising that the 
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gross operating rate in the architectural sector of Belgium is relatively small, despite the high share of 
self-employment.  
The opposite is true for Italy. The average architectural office in Italy purchases intermediate inputs 
that account for less than 30 percent of the total turnover. This is currently the lowest share of 
purchased inputs among the Member States. The large majority of the goods and services that 
generate the turnover is produced by self-employed owners. Only a very small part of the turnover is 
generated by employees or intermediate inputs. As an expected result, the gross operating rate is by 
far higher than in other Member State.  
The influence of the intermediate input share on the operating surplus decreases with an increasing 
number of employees. Nevertheless, albeit to a lesser extent, a below average share of intermediate 
inputs seems to lead to above average gross operating rates in the architectural sectors of Great Britain 
or Germany. However, the under-average gross operating rates in Slovenia, Hungary or Greece could 
be influenced by the above average input-share in the sectors in these countries.  
Aggregated country data enable a description of the relationship between a higher number of 
employees per architectural firm and a smaller operating surplus in a cross-country comparison as 
seen above. Furthermore, a sector study by the Architects Council of Europe (ACE) shows that this 
described relationship does also exist within each Member State, regardless of whether the average 
firm is rather small or big14. During this sector study, the operating surpluses were surveyed by 
company size for each Member State. Within all Member States, the statistical measure of the 
operating surplus decreases as the number of employees increases. The following figure illustrates the 
decreasing average surplus rate in the case of an increasing firm size (and therefore a lower work share 
of a potential self-employed owner) across all Member States (see figure 6). 
 
                                                          
14 Mirza & Nacey Research for ACE Europe, The Architectural Profession in Europe 2014, p. 40. In addition to the 
European Member States, the average surplus rate includes data from Switzerland and Turkey. No data for Czech 
Republic and Latvia:  
http://www.ace-cae.eu/fileadmin/New_Upload/7._Publications/Sector_Study/2014/EN/2014_EN_FULL.pdf  
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Figure 6: Average surplus rate of architectural enterprises by numbers of persons employed 
across all European States.  
 
Source: ACE Europe, The Architectural Profession in Europe 2014, p. 40. In addition to the European Member States, the 
average surplus rate includes data from Switzerland and Turkey. No data for Czech Republic and Latvia. Own presentation.  
 
To sum up, the gross operating rate is no reliable indicator for the level of competition in the 
architectural sector. In the case of a high share of self-employed owners, this indicator is 
systematically biased. The proportion of self-employment varies to a very high extend across the 
Member States. Therefore, cross-country comparisons of the gross operating rate cannot necessarily 
provide a reliable indication for potential reforms in the architectural sector. The interpretation of 
the gross-operating rate is even more difficult due to the varying share of intermediate inputs across 
the architectural sectors in the Member States.  
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On thesis number three: Too low productivity in the European architectural 
sector 
 
The European Commission states that the labour productivity in the architectural sector is 
comparatively low. To support this thesis, the European Commission refers to the value-added per 
person employed (see figure 6). The European Commission interprets this ratio as an indicator for how 
productively labour is used in the architectural sector. To indicate a below-average labour productivity 
in the respective national architectural sector, the value value-added per person employed is 
compared to the average value across all economic sectors (including primary sector, manufacturing 
sector and services sector) in every Member State15.  
 
Figure 7: Thesis number three of the European Commission:  Too low labour productivity in 
the European architectural sector 
 
Source: European Commission, Mutual evaluation of regulated professions, Overview of the regulatory framework in the 
business services sector by using the example of architects (GROW/E-5), p. 4 (2015) 
 
Why is the value-added per person employed relevant in the ongoing debate on potential reforms of 
the regulatory framework of architects? The intuition behind is that a below-average value-added per 
person employed could be an indicator for insufficient competition because enterprises with a low 
productivity would not survive in a competitive environment.  
In a cross-country comparison, the value-added per person in absolute terms (measured in Euro) is 
difficult to interpret. In a country with comparatively high wages and a high price level, hiring an 
employee usually leads to a higher value-added compared to a country with lower wages. Therefore, 
                                                          
15 The comparison group of „Total business economy” aggregates all economic sectors except financial and 
insurance activities, see: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=sbs_na_sca_r2&lang=en   
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it is not surprising that the difference in value added (in absolute terms) is driven by the different wage 
levels across the Member States. The lowest value added per person employed can be found in 
Bulgaria, the Member State with the lowest average hourly wage of all Member States (3.80 Euro in 
2014 according to Eurostat). The highest value-added can be found in Norway, the country with the 
highest average hourly wage across all compared countries (54.00 Euro in 2014 according to Eurostat).  
For this reason, the European Commission compares the value-added per person in the architectural 
sector with the average corresponding value across all other sectors within every Member State. 
However, this comparison is also of little significance. In short, the value-added per person employed 
can be increased by a higher performance of the employees (for example as a result of a better 
qualification) or by the additional use of machines.16 The latter makes a cross-sectoral comparison 
difficult. For example, the value-added in parts of the manufacturing sector can be increased by a more 
capital intensive production. This would be the case if fewer employees operate more and more 
machines and production lines. In the services sector, especially in the case of architectural services, 
this form of substitutability is generally lower.  
Since the number and qualification level of the workforce also influence the value added per person 
employed, the exact influence of a more capital-intensive production is hardly empirically observable. 
However, if the other influencing factors are assumed to be constant, a less capital-intensive 
production leads to a lower value added per person employed (what is defined as lower labour 
productivity). Therefore, it is nevertheless informative to compare the capital intensity of the 
production in the architectural sector and the whole economy (see figure 7). 
                                                          
16 Theoretically, the value-added can also be increased simply by the fact that a company or a sector can achieve 
higher prices for an unchanged product or service. This could happen in the case of market power or in the case 
of low competition. An under-average value-added (or value-added per person employed) can therefore 
theoretically also be a hint to a particularly intense competition in a sector. 
 
16 
 
Figure 8: Gross investment rate as an indicator for a low capital intensive production in the 
average European architectural sector (year 2014) 
 
Source: Annual detailed enterprise statistics for services (NACE Rev. 2 H-N and S95) and annual enterprise statistics for 
special aggregates of activities (NACE Rev. 2), own calculation and presentation 
 
The gross investments in tangible goods as a percentage of the turnover provides an indicator for the 
capital intensity of the production of an enterprise or a sector. The gross investment in tangible goods 
is defined as expenditure on purchases of long-term tangible assets such as machinery, production 
halls, computers and software solutions etc. The average investment rate in tangible goods across the 
whole economy including all economic sectors in all Member States was 4.21 percent in the year 2014. 
The aggregated average investment rate in the European architectural sector was 2.93 percent and 
thus about 30 percent lower than in total business economy. Therefore, there are good reasons to 
assume that the below average productivity in architecture is more of an indicator for the relatively 
low importance of capital investments than an indicator for insufficient competition. 
 
To sum up, a comparison of the value-added per person employed between more and less capital-
intensive sectors is biased. Since the input of machineries in the labour-intensive architectural sector 
is below the economy-wide average, a lower value added per person employed is not uncommon. 
The observation of a different value-added per persons employed across sectors with different 
production structures is no reliable indicator for insufficient competition in the architectural sector.  
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On thesis number four: Anticompetitive regulation in some Member States 
compared to others based on the OECD-indicator 
 
The European Commission states that the regulatory framework is not pro-competitive in the majority 
of the Member States. To support this thesis, the European Commission refers to the OECD regulation 
index for product market regulation (see figure 8)17. Every five years, the OECD conducts a survey 
amongst its members to build an indicator that is supposed to measure the intensity of regulatory 
restrictions in selected markets. Within professional services, four professions are examined, including 
architectural services. The indicator consists of the categories “market entry regulations” (e.g. 
requirements for profession-specific educational qualifications, membership in a chamber) and 
“behavioural regulations” (e.g. fee scales, bans on advertisement). The index calculated by the OECD 
fulfils two functions, a descriptive and an evaluative one. First of all, the Competition Law and Policy 
Datebase18, which the indicator is based upon, is meant to merely describe the regulation in the 
member state. An example for this would be the description whether there are chambers or not. Then, 
the indicator additionally evaluates the current regulation. In order to do this the different aspects of 
the regulation are being evaluated on a scale of 0 to 6. A lower value shows a competition-friendly 
regulation in the eyes of the OECD. To do this the OECD has to evaluate whether the existence of 
chambers has a positive or negative effect on the competitiveness of a member state. The OECD has 
evaluated the existence of chambers with a 6. In the eyes of the OECD the existence of chambers 
therefore has an extremely bad influence on competitiveness of a member state.  
 
Figure 9: Thesis number four of the European Commission: Anticompetitive regulation in 
some Member States compared to others based on the OECD-indicator.  
 
Source: European Commission, Mutual evaluation of regulated professions, Overview of the regulatory framework in the 
business services sector by using the example of architects (GROW/E-5), p. 5 (2015) 
                                                          
17 The OECD indicator can be found via 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm      
18 https://www.oecd.org/eco/reform/CLP-all-data-2013.xlsx   
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If – on the basis of the OECD indicator – recommendations for future reforms are made, the indicator 
should firstly replicate the regulation in a complete and correct manner. If one looks closely, a few 
inaccuracies can be noticed. For example the indicator shows jumping values for Germany, even 
though no change of regulation has taken place in the concerned field19. The OECD surveys the 
regulation by way of questionnaires that are sent to the responsible ministries of the member states. 
A cause of these inaccuracies could be non-transparent questions, which are being understood in 
different ways. Such issues can, however, barely be avoided when it comes to international surveys. 
Apart from these minor inaccuracies, the OECD indicator is generally able to correctly describe the 
situation. Of course the above is only true to the extent that all relevant questions have been asked. 
This leads to the question whether the OECD index covers all relevant criteria. Some states like to 
guarantee the quality of architectural services by way of entry and conduct regulation. Part of this idea 
is the self-regulation of professions by chambers (ex-ante). Other states guarantee the quality of 
services by way of a stronger liability system and/or surveillance by the responsible bodies (ex-post). 
Such measures of course interfere with the exercise of profession. However, these relevant areas are 
not covered by the OECD when describing the state of regulation.  
As a next step, the question arises whether the description of the current regulation is consistent and 
plausible. The OECD sees an ex-ante regulation, including chamber membership, education 
requirements and shared exclusive rights, as an interference of competition on the architecture sector. 
However, regulatory requirements linked with ex-post regulation like extended insurance obligations 
are not covered by the OECD. Therefore, it is not surprising that the main variation of the OECD 
indicator between the Member States is driven by the OECD judgment of the ex-ante regulatory 
approach (see figure 9). The OECD’s way of evaluation should therefore be subject of detailed 
examination.20   
                                                          
19 The reasons for jumping values are altering answers in the Competition Law and Policy Datebase related to the 
criteria “Education requirements” and “Exclusive or shared exclusive rights”. 
20 In a recent document the EU-Commission presented a new restrictiveness indicator for Architects and several 
other service professions (COM(2016)820 final, released on 1/10/2017). Compared to the OECD indicator, the 
Commissions new restrictiveness indicator should be more up-to-date with regard to regulatory changes in the 
Member States and the new indicator should capture the regulation in a more holistic approach. The latter would 
be in line with our criticism of the OECD indicator. But the EU-Commission also states that: “At this stage the 
indicator will, however, not reveal non-regulatory barriers or the role played by specific general laws or 
mechanisms in place to protect the consumers and the public interest objectives.” It remains to be seen how valid 
and reliable the new indictor is in the application. Moreover, the Commissions new indicator depicts only one 
point in time until now. Therefore, an analysis of regulatory changes over time is not yet feasible. 
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Figure 10: OECD PMR indicator for architecture 2013 without chamber membership, shared 
exclusive rights and education requirements 
 
Source: OECD (2013), Product Market Regulation Database, own calculation and presentation 
 
Educational requirements, access to profession and chamber membership  
The pursuit of the architecture profession generally requires qualifications related to the field. These 
will usually be attained by way of higher education, which is often supplemented by compulsory 
practice. However, there are exceptions to this. Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden have not informed the OECD of any education requirements for access to the profession.  
For a lawful pursuit of the profession, the states of Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia 
and Romania require a separate professional admission by way of obligatory membership of an 
association or chamber of architects, resulting in a higher index value for these countries.  
Particular questions of the OECD-Indicator are designed in a way that only vaguely reflects the actual 
degree of regulation. States in which the exertion of planning tasks does not require architectural 
admission are being recorded as missing an admission requirement and therefore receive a lower 
indicator value. However, this indicator value does not take into account that in these states the 
occupational title ‘architect’ is only to be used after registration with the competent authority 
(protection of professional title). To be registered there is usually a university degree needed, followed 
by professional training and compliance with professional conduct rules to be set by the registration 
authority. Furthermore, it disregards the fact that a meaningful offer of planning services on the 
market is only possible with the appropriate qualifications. Considering these aspects, the impact that 
the criterion of ‘entry requirements’ has on the market of architectural services is a lot smaller than 
the indicator value might suggest.  
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This effect is strengthened by faulty OECD data. For instance, neither the Netherlands nor the United 
Kingdom grant exclusive rights for architects, but do arrange for protection of the professional title. 
Whilst the Netherlands as well as Finland and Ireland, disregarding protection of title, did not report 
any regulation concerning professional admission, the United Kingdom listed the requirements of 
receipt of the title ‘architect’ in this category. Provided that similar regulation is in place elsewhere, 
this leads to a deviating indicator value and thus to a distorted account of competitiveness. This is 
because Finland requires a degree from professionals who elaborate blue prints.21 The Netherlands22, 
just like Ireland23, only permit the occupational title ‘architect’ if the professional is registered in the 
respective profession’s register. Requirement for such a registration is a degree. In the Netherlands, a 
registration at the Bureau Architectenregister24 is needed. The Royal Institute of the Architects of 
Ireland (RIAI)25 is the corresponding Irish corporation. Registration is mandatory for being able to use 
the title. An (additional) membership is optional. 
According to the OECD indicator, the requirement of compulsory membership in an association or 
chamber of architects hinders competition and thus leads to a higher indicator value. States without 
compulsory membership receive a lower indicator value. However, considering the criterion of 
compulsory membership on its own leads to distorted results. Member states with low indicator values 
such as the Netherlands or the United Kingdom also require the professional to register at the Bureau 
Architectenregister and the Architects Registration Board (ARB) respectively in order to carry the title 
‘architect’. Both institutions also function as supervisory authorities and therefore take on tasks which 
are similar to those the chambers of architects are concerned with. Due to a meaningful market 
presence only being possible under the title of an ‘architect’, the criterion of compulsory membership 
actually has a much smaller significance than the indicator value would suggest. Beyond that, 
compulsory membership in a professional association or a chamber of architects is the requirement 
for their supervision. This supervision will still be performed, even if it was not transferred to an 
association or a chamber of architects. In that case, it will be the duty of the state to fulfil the task. The 
regulatory standard is the same in both systems. Indeed, although representing similar competitive 
levels, they display different indicator values regarding competition. Some more evidence for 
comparable regulatory standards in Member States with or without a supervision through a chamber 
system can be found in a EU Commission report on regulation in the construction sector. For example, 
Denmark, a Member State with an architectural sector that is described a nearly unregulated by the 
OECD, is reported to have the strictest building regulations26. In this case, the supervision is conducted 
completely by the state itself.  
                                                          
21 Art. 3 Land Use and Building Decree: “A person drawing up a plan must have a university degree appropriate for 
the task and the experience that is called for by the difficulty of the task.” 
22 Wet op de architectentitel (Academic Titles (Architects) Act). 
23 Art. 18 Building Control Act 2007. 
24 https://www.architectenregister.nl/Home/index.aspx. 
25 http://www.riai.ie/. 
26 The study referred to the construction of a one-floor 2-bedroom house and a 10-floor office building as case-
studies. For further reading see the EU-COM report “Simplification and mutual recognition in the construction 
sector under the Services Directive” (MARKT/2014/087/E); 
 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8657&lang=en  
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Furthermore, there are also restrictions concerning not necessarily directly and alone the architectural 
profession, but regulating nevertheless the access to the profession. For instance, Denmark actually 
hinders the access to the architectural Service Market by regulating cross-border services.27  
 
Exclusive rights 
Exclusive rights affect competition to a particularly high degree. It is therefore of interest which 
profession-specific tasks can be performed by architects only and which ones can also be fulfilled by 
third parties. Services that are exclusive or shared exclusive to the architecture profession are 
feasibility studies, topographical determination, demarcation, land surveying, planning, requests for 
construction permits, preparation and monitoring of construction/execution, technical control and 
certification, construction cost management, urban and landscape planning and interior design. 
The OECD indicator permits a classification into states with strong, medium and less distinct regulation. 
A high number of exclusive or shared rights can be found in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Malta and Romania. France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania show a medium degree of regulation. Only few exclusive or 
shared rights are found in Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Great Britain and Bulgaria.  
The OECD indicator’ criterion of ‘exclusive or shared exclusive right’ only inaccurately pictures a state’s 
competitiveness. States that grant their architects few or no ‘exclusive or shared exclusive rights’ 
receive a low indicator value. What is not being taken into account is, however, the way in which states 
ensure the compliance with building regulations in force. In states with ‘exclusive or shared exclusive 
rights’ this responsibility lies with the architects, being the reason why Germany or Italy (to name but 
a few) do not provide for an inspection by the building supervisory authority. In states without 
‘exclusive or shared exclusive right’ such an inspection usually takes place in the course of the building 
permit process, e.g. in Denmark, Sweden or Finland, by architects or civil engineers who work in the 
responsible administrative authority. The overall competitiveness is similar, even though the OECD 
indicator declares very different values.  
 
Different regulatory approaches in Europe  
The Member States operate different systems which are meant to guarantee the quality of 
architectural services. The quality can cover different components such as construction safety, 
consumer and environmental protection as well as cultural, historical, archaeological and artistic 
concerns. In general, two different regulatory approaches or philosophies can be observed and 
distinguished:  
The first system (ex-ante), mainly pursued in continental Europe, reaches guarantee of quality by way 
of precautionary quality control. The second system (ex-post), mainly pursued in northern Europe, 
pursues the idea that quality should be mainly guaranteed by compensating occurred damage 
(compensatory model). To reach this objective, the liability system must be strict enough so providers 
                                                          
27 Denmark requires a fee-based registration in the Register for udenlandske tjenesteydere established for foreign 
corporations as well as a fee-based registration in the general corporate register. This requirement also applies to 
the occasional service delivery. If a company car is to be used for cross-border services, a fee-based registration 
in the Motorregistret may be required leading to costs of up to 150% of the actual vehicle’s value.  
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are no longer inclined to offer faulty quality. This second approach is also known as a system of 
subsequent control. 
Member states that follow the ex-ante system traditionally feature a higher degree of entry and 
conduct regulation. To this end, specific requirements for vocational training and admission to the 
profession, obligations of further training as well as regulations governing professional practice are put 
in place. These states regularly also provide for a chamber of architects. Member states that follow the 
second system (ex-post) regulate by way of a stricter responsibility for builders and real estate 
developers28 as well as more surveillance of the entire building process. 
The division of the Member towards one of these two regulatory approaches is somewhat arbitrary. 
There is a great continuum of regulatory frameworks between the poles of solely ex-ante and solely 
ex-post regulation. However, the Member States can be grouped based on the introduced criteria, at 
least to some extent. In the field of architectural services, one main feature of the ex-ante approach 
of precautionary control is the existence of exclusive rights. As seen above, these exclusive rights are 
to guarantee that safety-relevant activities are only carried out by registered and approved experts. 
When it comes to architectural services, these safety-relevant tasks are mainly the planning process 
and the request for construction permit. For the OECD indicator, all Member States report if they grant 
exclusive rights. In the map bellow (see figure 11), all Member States that grant exclusive rights for 
these tasks are coloured in green. To provide these architectural core services in these Member States, 
a future architect has to register at a professional chamber that supervises, inter alia, the specific 
educational requirements. Only in two Baltic states, the registration and licensing process is done by 
the state.    
In the remaining Member States, theoretically everybody is free to offer architectural planning 
services. The northern Member States Sweden, Finland and Denmark have no specific entry regulation 
such as compulsory educational requirements. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are 
somewhat in between. Although not granting specific exclusive rights, these countries grant title 
protection. As mentioned above, in this case a future architect usually needs to register at a 
professional association in order to carry the title ‘architect’. For a registration, these professional 
associations do have educational requirements that are comparable to the professional chambers in 
other Member States. At least to some extent, this title protection is an element of precautionary 
quality control. The main difference is that more responsibility lays with the consumer as he is free to 
choose an educated expert with the title “architect” or not.    
 
 
 
                                                          
28 One example for such a stricter responsibility through liability rules is the deposit of a security that is common 
in Denmark (all contracts that apply AB92 or ABT93). After the conclusion of the contract, the contractor usually 
deposits a security of 15 percent of the contract volume. After the acceptance of the work, the deposit is paid 
back in several stages.  
For more information, see also the database on country-specific regulation of the architectural department of the 
University of Siegen (in German language only): http://export.architektur.uni-siegen.de/index.php/europe/9-
daenemark#_ftn6  
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Figure 11: Different regulatory approaches of architectural services: A tendency towards ex-
ante regulation in continental Europe and towards ex-post regulation in northern Europe  
 
 
 
Member States that apply an ex-ante approach are coloured in green. Member States that have a tendency towards an ex-
post approach are coloured in dark blue. Own presentation based on the criterion of exclusive rights for the architectural tasks 
of “planning ((elaboration of blue prints)” and “Request for construction permit” in the Member States that have a tendency 
towards ex-ante regulation. Data form OECD (2013), Product Market Regulation Database. Basic map form Europe under free 
public Wikimedia Commons licensing. 
 
These described differences, stemming from a variety of established regulatory systems in Europe, can 
be found not only in the area of regulation of architects, but also elsewhere. Continental Europe 
operates a consumer protection system which is mainly based on the principle of prevention. This is 
due an established preventive legal system. The consumer is to be given legal certainty and 
transparency by regulating entry and conduct of the profession. The aim is to ensure a high level of 
qualification already for admission making it dependent on certain conditions. Furthermore, the 
quality of professional practice is being secured by compulsory professional training. Moreover, 
chambers support this process by monitoring and sanctioning breaches of duty. 
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A different system prevails in the Northern and Anglo-Saxon member states. These states have less ex-
ante regulation rules. Therefore, consumer protection is not primarily ruled by preventive provisions 
against abuse or improper performance, but a more ‘compensatory’ model which means to guarantee 
consumer protection mainly by way of liability mechanisms. Further measures are usually only 
applicable if the professional has previously joined a – in most cases non-compulsory – private law 
organisation.29  
Both approaches are to be seen as equivalent, the decision for one of the systems lays, from a legal 
perspective, with the member states. Yet, the OECD indicator favours the system of subsequent 
control. This is because due to the OECD’s criteria, the system of precautionary control is awarded a 
high indicator value, whereas the system of subsequent control’s value is lower. Based on this analysis, 
the regulatory system in the Member States that follow the first approach cannot be generally 
classified as being less pro-competitive. There is no systematic indicator for the economic performance 
being better or worse in the Member States which implemented a chamber system and the associated 
regulations. However, the ongoing debate on an appropriate regulatory framework for the 
architectural sector is driven by arguments based on statistical data. The question though is how to 
measure the performance of existing different regulatory systems. The indicators that the European 
Commission has put into the debate (number of persons employed per enterprise, gross operating 
rate, value-added per person employed) have proved unsuitable for the architectural sector in this 
analysis.   
On an abstract level, the performance of a regulatory system should be measured on the basis of the 
criterion “appropriate quality for a reasonable price”. Regarding the quality, there seems to be no 
evidence for the superiority of one of the two approaches found in the Member States. Measurable 
quality aspects could be above-average frequent planning errors. Aesthetic aspects of architecture as 
a part of quality do not appear to be comparable in a reasonable way. With regard to the price for 
architectural services, the price development in the Member States can be compared. Again, the 
question arises what could be a suitable categorisation of the Member States for such a comparison. 
Since the question of a compulsory chamber membership is one important aspect of the ongoing 
debate of different regulatory approaches, we decided to categorise the Member States based on this 
criterion. 
Eurostat calculates a producer price index for several services (SPPI). Architectural services are 
grouped with engineering services in this price index. This fact is not problematic when looking at the 
possible effect of a compulsory chamber membership. In the Member States with a chamber system 
for architects there is usually also a chamber system for engineers. When considering the aggregated 
price development, there is no indication that the Member States with regulatory systems based on a 
compulsory chamber membership perform worse. In the recent past, the increase of costs for 
architectural services in those Member States was even below the general price trend of the 
harmonized index of consumer prices in Europe (see figure 10). 
 
                                                          
29 See Metzler, Regulierung der Freien Berufe und Verbraucherschutz, S. 2 ff., 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/professional_services/conferences/20031028/arno_metzler.pdf.  
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Figure 12: Development of producer prices for architectural and engineering services between 
Member States with and without a compulsory chamber system.  
Trend between the years 2007 and 2016, standardized to the year 2007 = 100 percent 
 
Source: Eurostat, Services producer price index (SPPI), own calculation and presentation 
 
To sum up, the OECD regulation indicator does not reflect the actual level of regulation in the 
Member States. The indicator incidentally favours the regulatory system of subsequent control (ex-
post regulation). This is because due to the OECD’s criteria, the system of precautionary control (ex-
ante regulation) is awarded a high indicator value, whereas the system of subsequent control’s value 
is lower. Systematically, however, this different valuation cannot be substantiated. 
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Summary and outlook on potential useful reforms 
The main result of this research report is that there is no evidence of the superiority of one of the two 
different regulatory approaches in the Member States. Based on the indicators used by the EU-
Commission neither the ex-post approach nor ex-ante approach for the regulation of architectural 
services can be identified as more or less competition-friendly. Therefore, both systems are to be seen 
as equivalent not only from a legal but also from an economic perspective. The decision for one of the 
systems should lay with the member states. 
But the OECD database shows some country-specific rules that are not directly related to the general 
regulation approach in ex-post vs. ex-ante context. In many cases, there is no functional equivalent in 
the other Member States. Therefore, it is advisable to check the need for this regulation on the level 
of the respective Member States. These regulatory differences relate to rules of inter-professional co-
operation, advertising regulations and regulated prices and fees.  
 
Inter-professional co-operation  
According to the OECD indicator, most states do not have any restrictions concerning the inter-
professional co-operation of architects with other liberal professions. This is the case for Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. In other 
states, a co-operation is only permitted regarding comparable professions, as is the case for France, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus and Romania. In Austria and Belgium, however, most forms of co-operation are 
allowed. As far as architectural services are concerned, restrictions on possible co-operations do not 
make much sense, but they hinder the supply of joint services within one firm. It is therefore 
appropriate that restrictions of co-operation have a negative effect on the regulation indicator of the 
OECD in case of the profession of architects. Such limitations might however be justified for other 
professional groups to protect the client’s privacy (e.g. lawyers, tax advisers, auditors, healthcare 
professionals).  
 
Advertising restrictions 
Within the group of the European OECD Member States, most countries do not have special advertising 
restrictions for architects. Only Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Croatia and Cyprus 
report restrictions. In principle, two cases have to be distinguished: The first case concerns the 
promotion of one's own architecture office and its services. The second case concerns advertising for 
third parties, e.g. window manufactures. In the first case of self-promotion, there is no objective reason 
for special regulations in the area of architects. The general rules against misleading advertising should 
be sufficient to protect the consumers of architectural services. In the second case of advertising for 
third parties, advertising bans should ensure the independent consultation of the clients by the 
architect. There seems to be a fear that without such a ban, some architects would primarily 
recommend products from those manufacturers to their clients, with whom they have entered into an 
advertising agreement. The extent to which an advertising restriction for third parties can actually 
ensure transparent and independent advice in favors of the consumer would have to be investigated 
separately. 
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Regulations on prices and fees  
A few Member States have regulated fees or prices. Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania state that their fees/prices are determined by the state 
or by way of self-administration. The only states with binding minimum prices are Germany, Bulgaria 
and Croatia. In the remaining countries, there are only recommendations in place from which the 
parties of the contract may deviate. On the 17th of November 2016, the EU Commission decided to 
take legal actions at the European Court of Justice concerning the ongoing infringement proceeding 
against Germany’s binding minimum and maximum prices. At present, economic theory does not have 
a definitive answer to the question to what extend a higher income level trough guarantied fixed fees 
could indeed guarantee a higher quality in a market for credence goods like architectural services.  
 
Conclusion 
The current debate on the economic impact of different regulatory approaches is dominated by 
numbers and indicators. The objective of these numbers and indicators is to collect broad empirical 
evidence on the advantages or disadvantages of different regulatory approaches in the Member 
States. Appropriate indicators can indeed support the political decision-making process with helpful 
structural knowledge.  
However, improper selected or interpreted numbers or indicators can lead to incorrect conclusions 
on the need for action. In case of the regulation of architectural services, the Member States apply 
different regulatory approaches. These different approaches can be roughly divided into an ex-ante 
and an ex-post approach. At first glance, the numbers and indicators that are discussed in the 
ongoing debate may suggest that the ex-post regulation might be superior regarding the effects on 
competition. However, our research has shown that this conclusion is not valid, when the whole 
regulatory framework is taken into account.  
 
